5. Land and Livelihoods: by Lahiff, Edward
1 Introduction 
Southern Africa today presents a wide spectrum of 
land policies, embracing a variety of forms of 
redistribution and tenure reform initiatives, 
utilising methods that range from consensual, 
market-based approaches to forcible confiscation 
Having remained marginal to political debates in 
most countnes of the region for much of the 1980s 
and 1990s, land and land reform are back on the 
policy agenda to an extent unknown since the 
liberation struggles of the 1960s and early 1970s 
Recent events in Zimbabwe, in particular, have had 
strong resonance for political parties and landless 
people in those countnes, most notably South 
Africa and Namibia, where severe racial 
inequalities in landholding persist, and struggles 
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over land have become central to external 
perceptions of the region. Critical questions, 
therefore, are whether the Zimbabwean case is 
exceptional or an indication of tensions throughout 
the region, and whether the heightened political 
importance of land in the region is a product of 
changes in the regional or global economy, or a 
culmination of long-running processes at a more 
local level. 
While conditions vary considerably from country 
to country, a number of broad themes can be 
identified that provide a common context for the 
politics of land across the region. First, is the 
shared history of colonialism, and with it the 
dispossession and impoverishment of rural people, 
which shapes both patterns of landholding and 
discourses around the value of different types of 
land use. Second, is the growing impact of neo- 
liberal globalisation, in terms of both direct 
influences on agriculture and rural economies 
generally and on the policies being promoted by 
national governments and international agencies. 
Of particular importance here are the deregulation 
of markets, the withdrawal of state support to 
agricultural producers and the reliance on the 
private sector as the principal agent of 
development (see article 6, this Bulletin). Third, is 
the ongoing impoverishment of the mass of the 
rural population and the extreme precariousness of 
rural livelihoods. High rates of unemployment, 
poor returns to small-scale agriculture, lack of 
access to social services such as health and 
education, recurring drought and a rampant (and 
largely unaddressed) HIV/AIDS pandemic, serve to 
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erode existing livelihood activities and perpetuate 
relative and absolute poverty in rural areas (see 
article 2, this Bulletin). Last, is the re-emergence of 
the rural poor as political actors, to varying degrees 
throughout the region. Mobilisation around the 
Campanha Terra in Mozambique in 1996-97, the 
occupation of commercial farms by war veterans 
and others in Zimbabwe, and growng militancy by 
the Landless People’s Movement, among others, in 
South Africa since 2000. suggest that an important 
new phase in the politics of land in Southern Africa 
has begun (see also SLSA Research Papers 2,3 ,9 ,  11 
and 12). 
2 Mozambique 
Clearly, the experience of countnes in this study 
has differed greatly, and has shifted over time. 
From one perspective, Mozambique would appear 
to be the exception, in that, unlike Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, settler colonialism was effectively 
destroyed in the transition to democracy and 
independence. However, the policies adopted by 
the FRELIMO regime did not bring a return of land 
to “peasants”, but rather the perpetuation of a 
dualistic agriculture, dominated by state farms and 
collectives. The so-called “family sector” remained 
marginalised and often actively discriminated 
against. Only after nearly two decades of bitter civil 
war, and the official abandonment of socialism, did 
the state begin to reverse the historic 
discrimination against the peasantry (Bowen 
1993). 
With the transition from a socialist to a market- 
based economy, discourses on land in Mozambique 
have centred around two, closely related, issues: 
how to encourage (private) investment into rural 
areas, and thus more productive use of land and 
natural resources; and how to protect the rights of 
customary occupiers on communal land (Hanlon 
2002). These twin concerns represent two sides of 
a fundamental, and deeply histoncal, duality in the 
theory and practice of development in 
Mozambique, which have persisted in one form or 
another through the periods of settler colonialism, 
state socialism and market capitalism (see Lahiff 
and Scoones 2000). Mozambique’s Land Law of 
1997 was aimed at both protecting these 
customary rights of existing occupiers on 
communal land and clarifying and strengthening 
the rights of private companies and individuals 
wishing to acquire access to land and natural 
resources for commercial purposes (Tanner 2002; 
SLSA Research Papers 11 and 12). 
With this law, Mozambique has gone considerably 
further than other counties in the region to extend 
legal protection to the rights of communal land 
users by creating mechanisms whereby 
communities can delimit and register their 
communal land rights, while existing use nghts are 
recognised in law without the need for formal 
titling or registration. In Zambezia province, a total 
of 37 community delimitations’ have been 
completed (or are close to completion) since the 
regulations governing the process came into force 
in January 2000, at an average slze of 27,000 ha 
per delimitation (Norfolk 2002: 1). Most 
community delimitations have followed the 
boundaries of the regedorias (the area under a 
regulo, or traditional chief) as defined during the 
colonial era. Many of these delimited community 
lands include substantial areas that have prevlously 
been allocated (by the state) to private applicants 
(individuals or companies), but the regstration 
system appears capable of accommodating this 
degree of complexity (SLSA Research Paper 11: 24). 
However, this process has not fundamentally 
changed the highly unequal and duallstic nature of 
property relations in the country and, equally 
important, has not delivered significant material 
benefits to the rural population. Other concurrent 
government policies, notably the pnvatisation of 
former state enterprises and the granting of 
concessions to commercial operators, continue to 
place much of the best land, and natural resources, 
in the hands of elite groups, both national and 
foreign, albeit now wthin a framework of market 
capitalism. 
Official attention to date has largely focused on the 
potential of the Land Law to promote private 
(“external”) investment, rather than on the 
development of the small-holder (peasant) sector 
As Norfolk, Nhantumbo and Pereira (SLSA 
Research Paper 11: 8) point out, this is reflected in 
the position of key developmental initiatives such 
as the agricultural sector investment programme 
(PROAGRI) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
and Plan (PARPA): 
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‘The PROAGRI and the PARPA both tend to 
stress the neo-liberal elements of the 
development approach in rural areas (those of 
maximising foreign exchange earnings, 
encouraging public-private partnerships, 
economic growth, the creation of rural 
employment opportunities and other aspects of 
“tnckle down”). Very little attention in either of 
these policy instruments is paid to the issue of 
tenure reform at community level and the 
emphasis has been strongly upon the need to 
streamline access for the private sector uptake 
of land nghts in the rural areas. To the extent 
that this represents a strategy for growth, it 
would appear that the poor majority have little 
role to play and the potential of the Land Law 
has not been fully appreciated.’ 
In Zambezia, there have been 139 registered 
consultations with communities regarding private 
applications for land, of which 100 have 
subsequently been approved (SLSA Research Paper 
11: 2 5 ) .  While pnvate applicants are generally 
followng the necessary procedures in terms of 
consulting the communities concerned, this is not 
translating into significant material benefits for 
community members. In the majonty of cases 
analysed, private applicants undertook to provide 
employment for local people, but in only one out 
of 48 cases was any firm agreement reached around 
the exact number of jobs or the levels of 
remuneration to be provided. In other cases, 
applicants agreed to make agncultural produce or 
livestock available for locals to purchase, or to 
provide other services such as shops, milling or 
ploughing (all on a commercial basis). In only 5 
per cent of cases did the applicants agree to provlde 
some form of direct compensation to existing land 
nghts holders. 
In the prevailing conditions of deep rural poverty 
and underdevelopment, many peasant 
communities appear to be wlling (or feel they have 
little alternative) to sign over substantial areas of 
their communal lands in exchange for vague 
promises of access to employment or commercial 
services. It is impossible to say what the 
opportunity cost to the community may be, now or 
in the future, in terms of foregoing the use of their 
land. It is equally impossible to say whether 
communities are getting a good deal, and what the 
“real” (market) value of their land might be. What 
can be said is that under conditions of relative 
abundance of land, desperate needs for income and 
semces among rural communities, little effective 
competition between private applicants, and 
minimal advice or support to communities from 
state or other bodies, the effective value of a legal 
right in land is exceedingly low, and the tenure 
reform process may contribute little to the 
alleviation of rural poverty. 
The struggle for land and rural livelihoods that has 
characterised rural Mozambique for the past 
century has not abated, but has rather entered a 
new (neo-liberal) phase. Mozambique is now 
wtnessing a partial retreat from the achievements 
of the 1997 Land Law and Land Campaign. 
Evidence for this can be found in the minimal 
resources allocated by the state to the 
implementation of the Law, and foot-dragging by 
key state agencies, a lack of enthusiasm among 
NGOs to implement the provisions of the Law; and 
a renewed effort by pnvate capital, w t h  close allies 
in cabinet, to renegotiate the terms of the 1997 
consensus (under the banner of “privatisation”). In 
this respect, the Mozambican “land question” 
continues to be shaped by a history of 
dispossession, exclusion and exploitation, and so 
shares much w t h  neighbounng Zimbabwe and 
South Afnca. 
3 Zimbabwe 
From another perspective, Zimbabwe is wdely 
seen as the exceptional case in southern Africa: the 
country that has succeeded in putting radical land 
reform back on the political agenda, an 
anachronistic revival of “socialist” interventionism 
amidst the triumph of laissez-faire capitalism. And 
yet, few can be surprised the land question in 
Zimbabwe has come to the fore. Radical 
redistnbution of land has remained a staple of the 
Zimbabwe political discourse since long before 
independence (Palmer 1977; Moyo 1995). 
Emerging evidence from the first decade of 
resettlement demonstrates that not only is land 
reform possible, but that it can deliver significant 
material benefits too (Kinsey 1999). The unfolding 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe, fuelled by drought 
and spectacular mismanagement by government 
and international institutions alike. has contributed 
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to a collapse of livelihood opportunities and 
growng desperation on the part of large sections of 
both the urban and rural populations. 
The slide from economic crisis to economic 
meltdown in the late 1990s, and the manifest 
inability of the government to cope, has been 
accompanied by an equally profound cnsis of 
political legitimacy (Sachikonye 2002). In the face 
of mass popular dissatisfaction, the ZANU(PF) 
regme has degenerated into increasing molence 
and authontananism. In this context of heightened 
social conflict, political tension and economic 
desperation, the gross inequality in landholding by 
a small racial minonty could not be expected to be 
sustained. While much attention has focused on 
the role of the state in orchestrating the 
(sometimes) violent seizure of white-owned farms, 
recent research from throughout the country 
highlights the enormous (but clearly not 
unanimous) popular pressure for redistnbution of 
land, from a wide range of social groups (Alexander 
and McGregor 2001; Moyo 2001; SLSA Research 
Paper 3 )  Of these, the most conspicuous has been 
the so-called war veterans, a vaned grouping that 
has succeeded in captunng the symbolic apparatus 
of the liberation struggle, embracing extreme 
nationalism, militansm and the return of land to 
the dispossessed and helped create the conditions 
for a dramatic departure from the constitutionally- 
based resettlement policies of the past. I t  is no 
coincidence, of course, that this swerve to the “left” 
(or new nationalist fundamentalism) took place in 
the face of the most concerted challenge since 
independence from the “nght”, in the form of the 
loose alliance that makes up the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC).l 
While the seizure of (mostly) white-owned farms, 
and the accompanymg violence, undoubtedly 
marks a new phase in Zimbabwean affairs, it does 
not necessanly imply a total break with the 
dominant neo-liberal orthodoxy. Zimbabwe is 
clearly (intentionally or otherwise) disarticulating 
itself from the international political and economic 
system in certain key respects. particularly in terms 
of inward investment, convertibility of the 
currency, access to donor funding and isolation of 
the regime. But many aspects of the capitalist 
economy remain more or less intact. Thus, while 
certain property nghts are being overthrown, this 
does not amount to the abolition of pnvate 
property. Land that is being redistributed under the 
“fast track” reforms is effectively being granted 
under the highly-individualised (and relatively 
secure) model used for redistribution since 1980.’ 
Moreover, the recent move to larger indimdual 
holdings (A2 model), coupled with the reallocation 
of entire farms to members of the ruling elite. 
appears to signal a consolidation of pnvate 
property, albeit in new hands, in what is likely to be 
a more wdely distributed (and thus potentially 
more sustainable) system of private property.’ 
Similarly, the mode of production on resettled land 
under the fast track scheme does not appear to 
differ greatly from that in older, resettlement areas 
and, especially at the larger end of the scale, would 
appear to signal the emergence of a new class of 
(Afncan) capitalist farmers. Thus, despite the 
radical nature of land redistribution in Zimbabwe, 
w t h  its evldent rejection of market mechanisms, 
there is little sign of a whole-scale rejection of the 
system of private property or of the capitalist mode 
of production and, perhaps most stnkingly, no 
suggestion of an alternative (be it nationahsation, 
collectivisation or African socialism) to the 
dominant neo-liberal orthodoxy. 
Nevertheless, recent events in Zimbabwe are 
having profound effects on the wider social, 
economic and political order. A major question, 
therefore, is whether the current redistribution of 
property rights can, in the longer term, promde the 
foundation for a new social and economic order in 
the countryside, or will it become a casualty of the 
further political and economic upheavals that 
surely await in the not-too-distant future. 
Events in Zimbabwe have put land reform back on 
the political agenda in a most dramatic way, and 
have brought about a radical redistnbution of 
assets. Occumng as they do in the midst of major 
political and economic turmoil. it is very difficult to 
predict the long-term outcome Indeed, it is not at 
all certain that the changes in land-holding wll 
outlast the current regime, or even that the regime 
wll continue to support the occupations once it 
believes its grip on power has been adequately 
strengthened. Nonetheless, a number of broad 
patterns can be identified which are likely to have 
deep and lasting consequences 
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First, the previously unhnkable scenario of a forcible 
seizure of privately-owned (and some state-owned) 
land “from below”, with full backmg from the state, 
has occurred. This poses a fundamental challenge to 
how land reform is perceived, both in Zimbabwe and 
throughout southern Afnca. Whde some would argue 
that it has set back the cause of land reform, the 
message that alternatives to market-based approaches 
to land do exist has not been lost on landless people 
(and others) in the region. The ramfications of such 
militancy are almdy clearly evident in South Afnca 
and, to a lesser extent, Namibia. 
Second, there have been a variety of winners and 
losers in the struggle for land. White landowners 
are the most widely-mentioned losers, but they are 
greatly outnumbered by the tens of thousands 
(possibly hundreds of thousands), of farm workers 
that have lost their jobs and often their homes 
(Rutherford 2001). While some farm workers have 
been incorporated into the new settlements (not 
always voluntarily), many more have to face an 
uncertain future in the communal areas and 
townships. The rise of authoritarianism has 
strengthened the hand of hard-line elements within 
ZANU(PF), in alliance with the war veterans, and 
sidelined (or subverted) other institutions such as 
rural district councils. Traditional leaders, too, have 
been rehabilitated in the communal areas, 
particularly with regard to land administration, but 
appear to be playing a largely symbolic role in the 
new resettlement areas (SISA Research Paper 3). 
Third, on the critical question of land nghts, 
especially the nghts of the poor, the latest, and 
most substantial, round of redistribution has 
proceeded with little or no reference to formal 
rights. Land continues to be allocated by state or 
party officials, in one guise or another, in a broadly 
similar manner to that applied in resettlement areas 
since 1980. During this latest period of major 
social upheaval, the scramble for access to land has 
clearly taken precedence over discussions of long- 
term tenure security The future land rights of the 
new wave of settlers will depend greatly on future 
developments in the wder political sphere. Given 
the absence of a clear discourse around 
formalisation of land rights, and lack of progress 
wth  tenure reform since independence, it seems 
unlikely that land rights, as distinct from land 
access, will emerge as a key issue in the near future. 
4 South Africa 
Given the multiple problems being experienced 
with land reform in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 
considerable hopes are riding on the outcome of 
the land reform programme being implemented in 
South Africa. The land reform programme adopted 
since 1994 by the African National Congress is, 
from some perspectives, much more ambitious and 
wide-ranging than policies being pursued 
elsewhere in the regon, aiming as it does to 
redistribute a substantial proportion of agncultural 
land to emerging black farmers, to restore land 
rights lost under previous regimes and to secure 
the tenure rights of occupants of both communal 
and privately-owned land. This seemingly radical 
agenda, however, is being implemented within 
what is by far the most advanced capitalist 
economy in Africa, with the most firmly 
entrenched system of private property, presided 
over by a government that has distinguished itself 
of late as the leading proponent of neo-liberalism 
on the continent. South Afnca is a crucial test of 
the market-based (or market-assisted) land reform 
policies being advocated by multilateral bodies 
such as the World Bank, the Food and Agncultural 
Organisations (FAO) of the World Bank, and 
various western governments, and early indications 
here and elsewhere are that i t  is not being 
particularly successful (Riedinger et al. 2001; El- 
Ghonemy 2001; Bernstein 2002). 
At the heart of the South African dilemma is a 
broad-based consensus between the main political 
parties and the representatives of private capital to 
preserve the fundamental structure of the capitalist 
economy, albeit with the addition of new black faces 
among managers and owners (Bond 2000). In the 
agricultural sector, this means preserving what is 
wdely seen as a highly efficient commercial 
agnculture sector, based on large-scale, capital- 
intensive production, with high export potential. 
This is reflected in the prominence given to abstract 
conceptualisations of markets throughout land 
reform policy, land for the landless will be supplied 
by “the market”, beneficiaries will be selected 
(largely) on their ability to produce for “the 
market“, support semces for resettled farmers will 
be accessed through “the market”. The slow pace of 
land redistribution to date can not be explained 
solely in terms of market failure, indeed, land 
markets in South Africa are considered to function 
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relatively efficiently (Aliber and Mokoena ZOOZ), 
and markets for both agricultural inputs and 
outputs have lost much of the monopolisation and 
regulation that characterised them in the recent 
past. Equally important has been the very limited 
funding and other support provided by the state, 
and the absence (until very recently) of an effective 
rural social movement pushing the pace of reform. 
After land redistribution (including "restitution" of 
historical land claims), the biggest challenge facing 
land reform in South Africa is reform of the system 
of communal tenure prevailing in the former 
"homelands". Communal (or customary, or 
traditional) land tenure poses particular challenges 
to the neo-liberal position. As in Mozambique, the 
communal areas tend to be seen by policy-makers 
as having little potential for self-generated growth. 
Any contribution they might make to the national 
economy is assumed to be in the form of large-scale 
commercial enterpnses (in sectors such as tourism 
and natural resource extraction, as well as 
agnculture), driven by external investment (see 
article 6, this Bulletin). Although the communal 
areas are generally seen as economically marginal, 
they are also seen as politically unpredictable, and 
the ANC has shown considerable caution in 
dealing with traditional leaders. Wanness of a 
political backlash led by the chiefs has been a key 
factor behind the failure to implement reforms of 
communal tenure to date, and behind the very 
limited perspective of the recent Communal Land 
Rights Bill, which proposes a model of land titling 
that is likely to undermine exlsting (non-market) 
systems of collective land management.' 
Nine years into the transition to democracy in 
South Afnca, land reform policy and the institutions 
associated with it continue to evolve and to address 
previously neglected areas. Considerable progress 
has been made in the settlement of urban restitution 
claims, the redistnbution of some former white- 
owned commercial farms and the formulation of 
Integrated Development Plans for some rural areas. 
Both the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) md the 
Regonal Land Claims Commissions have shown 
themselves to be increasingly effective actors, 
developing close working relationships wth a range 
of governmental and non-governmental agencies. 
Civil society structures, too, have shown themselves 
willing and able to challenge government policy 
and demand the type of services that best suit their 
needs. Nonetheless, major issues remain to be 
addressed, including the needs of people living in 
the "deep rural" areas of the former homelands, and 
particularly the reform of communal tenure. 
While claiming to address livelihoods, poverty 
alleviation and development of rural areas, the 
South African land reform programme has 
struggled to achieve these objectives, for various 
reasons. Particular programme areas, such as 
restitution, redistribution and tenure reform, have 
been developed and implemented largely in 
isolation from each other and have been poorly 
integrated into broader processes of rural 
development. This lack of integration can in turn 
be related to the lack of a comprehensive rural 
development strategy at either provincial or 
national levels. 
Complex governmental structures present a major 
challenge to land reform policy, in terms of policy 
design,- intwinstitutional cooperation and, 
accountability. The key institutions associated wth 
land reform in the provinces are branches of a 
national government department and, as such, are 
not dmctly accountable to any institution w i h n  
their areas of operation. Major policy changes 
emanate largely from the centre, although provlnwl- 
level stmctures can at times influence national policy 
While national government occasionally engage< in 
public consultation around policy development, no 
effective mechanisms exist, either through the 
political system or otherwise, to make land reform 
institutions accountable to their primary 
constituency, the rural poor and landless, or to gve 
this constituency a meaningful voice withm the 
policy-making process. This has contnbuted to a 
growing sense of frustration among many would-be 
beneficianes of land reform and the recent emeqence 
of the militant Landless People's Movement Major 
work remains to be done if sustainable livelihoods 
approaches are to be integrated into South African 
land reform, and rural development pohq more 
ger-erally, and to create a decentralwd institutional 
framework that is accountable to local people and 
responsive to their needs. 
The particular version of "demand-led" 
redistnbution pursued by DLA to date has not only 
failed to meet its political targets, it has also failed 
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to provide land on the necessary scale and in the 
areas where it is most needed. On the basis of the 
budgets provided for land reform and performance 
to date, it can be safely concluded that the effective 
aim of government is a modest transfer of 
agricultural land, probably no more than 4 per cent 
in the 15 years from 1994 and limited to areas 
voluntarily released by existing landowners and 
favounng a small minority of the rural black 
population, selected on the basis of their skills, 
material resources and entrepreneurial attitude. 
Such an approach is, however, unlikely to meet the 
needs of the great mass of the rural poor, 
particularly marginalised groups such as women, 
youth, the unemployed, the disabled and 
households affected by HIV/AIDS. 
Overall, may be said that, despite some successes, 
the South African land reform programme has not 
lived up to its promise to transform land-holding, 
combat poverty and revitalise the rural economy 
The policies adopted by government have left the 
structure of the rural economy largely intact and, in 
the case of liberalisation of agncultural markets and 
cuts in agricultural support services, have 
contributed to a climate that is hostile to emerging, 
resource-poor farmers. If land reform is to meet its 
wider objectives, new ways wll have to be found to 
transfer land on a substantial scale, and to provlde 
the necessary support services to a much wider class 
of land owners. 
5 Conclusion: the prospects for 
pro-poor land reform in southern 
Africa 
This article has reviewed some of the main trends 
around land and land policy in southern Africa, 
with particular reference to Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe and South Afnca. Here, the emerging 
lessons and prospects for the livelihoods of the 
rural poor, are considered under two key headings: 
redistnbution and land nghts. 
5.1 Redistribution 
The classic model of land reform - land to the tiller 
- has always been problematic in Africa. On the 
one hand, large numbers of people have been 
dispossessed and removed from their land, to 
return in some case as wage labourers. On the 
other hand, large numbers of “peasant” producers 
have managed to retain some access to land, 
typically poorer quality land in economically 
marginal areas. Thus, the demand for 
redistribution of land from elite groups (including 
colonial-era settlers and the state) to the landless 
and near-landless -what Bemstein (1996: 41) calls 
“land to the former tiller” - remains a central 
demand of the rural poor, but one that has received 
very limited support from governments and, of 
late, has been enmeshed in “market-based’’ 
approaches that have yielded very limited results. 
Mozambique is currently experiencing 
redistnbution “from above”, as those (allegedly) 
w t h  the means to bring land and natural resources 
into (market-onented) productive use are given 
favourable access. Far from being empty or unused, 
such land, forests and wldlife are typically an 
integral part of local economies. What “downward” 
redistnbution of assets has taken place informally 
over the past 30 years, due mainly to the collapse or 
abandonment of state or settler enterprises, is 
rapidly being reversed, not through “the market”, 
but through coercive measures on the part of 
returning owners, new entrepreneurs and the state. 
In the face of determined efforts to concentrate key 
assets in the hands of a narrow elite, the recognition 
of informal and customary rights under new 
legislation may be of very limited value. 
In South Afnca, where a text-book example of 
World Bank-inspired redistribution forms the 
centrepiece of land reform policy, the severe 
limitations of the market-based approach are 
plainly ewdent. This, perhaps ironically, has less to 
do with failures of “the market” or of current land 
owners to part with their property, than the very 
limited assistance made available by the state to the 
landless and the refusal to proactively engage in the 
land market in order to secure outcomes 
favourable to the mass of the rural poor. Thus, 
market-based redistnbution becomes piecemeal 
redistnbution, secunng benefits for a lucky few, 
but leaving the fundamental structures of the 
agranan economy, and the problems of mass rural 
poverty and landlessness, largely intact. 
The redistribution of land currently underway in 
Zimbabwe holds important lessons for the region, 
and for South Africa in particular. The racial 
60 
maldistribution of land in Zimbabwe at 
independence was considerably less severe than it 
is in South Africa today. On top of this, the scale of 
redistribution since independence is virtually 
unprecedented on the continent. And yet, under 
conditions of deep political and economic crisis, an 
even greater redistnbution of land has taken place, 
as the state and elements of the (predominantly) 
rural poor form new alliances against (supposedly) 
common enemies. It is impossible to know the full 
social and economic consequences of this 
redistribution, either for the country as a whole or 
for those directly affected, or whether it is 
sustainable. The long-term outcome will, however, 
have major repercussions on debates around the 
means and ends of redistribution more generally. 
Overall, the evidence of the last ten years suggests 
that there is little principled commitment to a 
fundamental redistribution of land and other 
natural resources to the rural poor in southern 
Afnca. The predominant role of the state in 
Mozambique, and the free market in South Africa, 
means that redistnbution ”upwards”, to exlsting 
landholders or to those with sufficient capital to 
invest in production for the market, is likely to 
outweigh any “downward” redistribution achieved 
through official land reform policy In Zimbabwe, 
where more moderate attempts at redistribution 
over 20 years have proved inadequate, a form of 
redistribution more radical, more vlolent and, 
potentially, more destructive than most would have 
considered possible is now underway, the true 
costs and benefits of which wll take years to be 
known. The lesson of Zimbabwe is surely that the 
ways in which land can be redistnbuted are 
numerous, and that conspicuous inequality in asset 
ownership provides an irresistible target in times of 
stress. Rural people themselves have shown a lack 
of patience w t h  so-called land reforms that leave 
the structures of inequality largely unchanged. 
Policy makers would be well advlsed to find means 
of redistnbution that go beyond the very limited 
approaches dominant in the region today. 
5.2 Land rights 
In common with much of the rest of the world, 
land policy in southern Africa, with the notable 
exception of Zimbabwe, over the past decade has 
focused more on land nghts than land access (or 
redistribution). This betrays a fundamental 
scepticism at the heart of policy around the benefits 
(economic, social, political) of redistributing assets 
to the poor (as opposed to a new or establlshed 
middle class or corporations). This can, in turn, be 
related to the evident lack of influence of the poor 
(and especially the rural poor) on the political 
process (South Africa and Mozambique being 
prime examples). 
The discourse of land rights, by its nature, relates 
almost entirely to situations where defacto nghts, 
particularly customary rights, are well-establlshed 
and face little or no contestation. This is the main 
thrust of land reform throughout most of the regon, 
effectively the only component of policy in 
Mozambique, and by far the most important (in 
terms of numbers of people and area of land 
potentially affected) in South Africa As dwussed 
above, the benefits of such reforms in terms of 
improved livelihoods of the rural poor have yet to be 
demonstrated on a substantial scale While 
“communal” areas throughout the region suffer from 
a range of deeply entrenched problem, including 
shortages of “external” and “internal” investment, 
limited (or no) markets in land and lack of access to 
credit, there is little evidence to suggest that these 
mues will be resolved through the “institutional hx” 
of tenure reform (Bernstein 2002: 451). 
Rather, there are strong grounds to believe that 
attention to land nghts in the absence of land 
redistnbution or wider, pro-poor agranan reforms, 
are favoured by policy-makers, because they ’fit” 
with a particular (neo-liberal) vlew of development 
(or post-development), that is, they are driven 
largely by ideology (from above) rather than popular 
demand (from below). Legal recognition of 
customary rights comes at relatively little cost to the 
state, or to private capital. While ostensibly 
protecting the rights of rural poor, such reforms also 
serve to bnng the poor and the land resources under 
their control, into the ambit of the market system, 
unlocking opportunities for accumulation from 
below (wthin communities) and from above (by 
external investors). Indeed, it may well be argued 
that the interests best served by the formallsation of 
customary land nghts in Mozambique and (as 
proposed) in South Afnca wll be those of “external” 
investors, who can now enter into legally-binding 
contracts w t h  clearly identified parties. 
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The ambiguity surrounding the current emphasis 
on formal, legal (as opposed to economic) rights 
can also be seen in areas outside the reform of 
customary rights, particularly in South Africa. 
Thus, the restitution programme is wdely lauded 
as a success, even though, in the majority of claims 
settled, no land has actually been restored. In a 
number of other cases, the restoration of “land 
rights” has fallen short of granting full use and 
access rights to claimants. Again, the implications 
of this emphasis on the formal rights of ownership, 
as opposed to rights of use and access, are still far 
from clear. However, some indications are available 
from the redistribution programme, the one area of 
South Africak land reform programme expressly 
intended to provide land for productive purposes. 
Imposition of Communal Property Associations, 
and other collective models of ownership and 
share-equity schemes, demonstrates a narrow focus 
on formal rights of ownership, rather than broader 
issues of secunng economic opportunities for those 
previously denied them. A worrymg failure rate 
among such projects, including in some case actual 
loss of the land so recently gained, once again 
highlights the limited value to be gained from 
formal ownership (and, of course, the inherent risk 
in commercial enterprises). The current emphasis 
on rights as a contribution to the economic 
uplifting of the rural poor therefore may well be 
over-stated (see article 8, this Bulletin). 
Further limitations to the rights-based approach can 
be seen in areas where rights are contested by 
powerful actors. Examples can be found on 
commercial farms in South Africa, and on former 
state enterprises and cooperatives in Mozambique, 
where legislation designed to protect the rights of 
occupiers has proved inadequate in the face of 
determined action by pnvate landowners and 
commercial interests, often wth close connections 
to the state. It is perhaps significant that rights have 
not emerged as a prominent discourse in Zimbabwe, 
either regarding the communal areas, the older 
resettlement areas or the new fast track resettlement. 
All of this suggests that enhanced land rights are 
more likely to be tolerated and enforced where they 
serve rather than challenge the interests of other, 
more powerful actors or the dominant ideology of 
the market. In this sense, an exclusively rights- 
based approach to land reform (especially where 
this is focused narrowly on rights of ownership or 
occupation) poses very little threat to the dominant 
economic structures and does not adequately 
address the fundamental causes of rural poverty 
and inequality 
In conclusion, the politics of land in southern Afnca 
has entered a new and dramatic phase. Rural 
livelihoods are under severe stress and the neo- 
liberal policies favoured by most governments in 
the region are failing to bring about fundamental 
change in the structure of poverty and inequality. 
Signs of a new mood among the rural poor in South 
Africa, inspired by events in Zimbabwe, suggest that 
the current orthodoxy of neo-liberal globalisation is 
likely to face considerable challenges “from below” 
in the not-too-distant future. 
Thls is an edited version of SLSA Research Paper 19. 
Helpful contnbutions were promded by Joseph 
Chaumba, lsilda Nhantumbo, Simon Norfolk, Joao 
Pereira, Ian Scoones and William Wolmer. The 
complete list of S E A  Research Papers is found OR 
page 116 of this Bulletin and full text versions are 
available at. www.ids.ac.uk/slsa. 
Zambtzia accounts for approximately one-third of all 
such delimitation in the country 
The political signifiers of “left” and “nght” are no 
longer a particularly useful nor conspicuous feature 
of political discourse in Zimbabwe ZANU(PF), 
however, has consistently attempted to portray the 
MDC as representative of the Rhodesian old-guard 
and their British (colonial) allies, and itself as the 
guardian of the revolution. The cross-class support 
, 
enjoyed by the MDC, contrasting with the increasing 
authontananism, appetite for self-ennchrnent and 
anti-worker stance of ZANU(PF) would suggest an 
alternative reading. 
Model A resettlement: indimdual (permit) nghts to 
residential and arable land, wth shared access to 
communal grazing, constitutes over 90 per cent of all 
resettlement prior to 1999. 
Chaumba el al (2003) highlight additional, 
technical, continuities, between fast track and earlier 
forms of resettlement, stretching back to the pre- 
independence era (SLSA Research Paper 2). 
‘Row erupts over land law’, Mail 6 Guardian 2 
August 2002. 
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